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INTRODUCTION
ARYEH NEIER
PRESIDENT, OPEN AIR SOCIETY
I am Aryeh Neier, President of the Open Society Institute, and it is
my privilege this afternoon to introduce Justice Louise Arbour. Jus-
tice Arbour has served as the Chief Prosecutor for the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda for the
past year and a half.
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I just asked her to reconfirm how long she has been in office. She
thought for a moment, and agreed that it was a year and a half-
though it felt like twenty years. I can sympathize with her sentiments.
It is an extraordinarily demanding assignment. The responsibility
for bringing prosecutions in two international tribunals on two conti-
nents-with the extraordinary range of crimes that were commit-
ted-is incredibly daunting.
I can recall some five years ago, when the Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia was being established. There were many persons skepti-
cal about the effort. Mainly, they felt it would be impossible to ap-
prehend those indicted by the Tribunals and that the entire cause-
international justice for great crimes-would be set back by the estab-
lishment of the tribunals. I think the events of those years have
proved the nay-sayers wrong, even though it was not always clear.
It took some fourteen months after the United Nations Security
Council approved the establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") until the appointment
of a chief prosecutor. Inevitably, that set back the effort to bring in-
dictments. The first Chief Prosecutor, Justice Goldstone, had to focus
a large part of his efforts on the attempt to win international public
backing for the Tribunals. Accordingly, much of his time was de-
voted externally. I think it is fair to say that in contrast, Justice Ar-
bour primarily focuses internally on the operations of the Tribunals
and on making sure that they bring only credible and effective prose-
cutions.
It seems to me that we have quite a lot of evidence about the
credibility won by the Tribunals. It is clear that momentum is now
behind the effort to establish a permanent International Criminal
Court. Although it seems most likely that such a court will be estab-
lished, there is still a great deal to be said about the way it should op-
erate. The fact that it will be established, however, is largely due to
the credibility that the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda have achieved.
Another sign of the credibility achieved by the Tribunals has been
provided by developments involving the recent killings that occurred
in Kosovo. When the Contact Group met in London a few days after
these killings, one of its actions was to call on the prosecutor to ex-
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pand her investigations to include the Kosovo events. The United
Nations Security Council has also called for such a step.
It is important to note that the United Nations resolution estab-
lishing the ICTY refers to the territory of the former Yugoslavia and
to events since 1991. Unlike the Rwanda Tribunal, the resolution
does not establish an end point for the covered period, thereby mak-
ing it possible to expand the investigations to deal with Kosovo.
I had a conversation yesterday with a visiting colleague from
Kosovo, somebody who I regard as a particularly knowledgeable and
astute observer of events there. We were talking about the possibility
that additional violence would take place in Kosovo. He asserted that
although the prospect of additional violence is overwhelming, one
factor entering into the equation is that the security forces of the Ser-
bian government are mindful of the Tribunal. He believes that this
will have some effect on their performance. I do not know whether
this is a correct assumption. But the very fact that it is possible for
somebody from Kosovo, knowledgeable about the current situation,
to believe that the security forces are even thinking about the Tribu-
nal, is an extraordinary testament to the Tribunal's emerging credi-
bility.
Overall, I believe that the Chief Prosecutor for the Tribunals is the
person who, above all others, has to be given credit for the Tribunals'
credibility. The Chief Prosecutor, more than anyone else, is the pub-
lic face of the Tribunals. The Chief Prosecutor has to be relied upon
to act effectively and fairly on behalf of the Tribunals. Obviously, the
judges, the defense attorneys, and the Registrar, all have crucial roles
to play, but the nature of this process puts a disproportionate share of
the burden on the Chief Prosecutor. Justice Arbour has done us proud
in shouldering that burden.
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HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA
PRESENTATION BY THE HONORABLE LOUISE ARBOUR
CHIEF PROSECUTOR, THE AD HOC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA
INTRODUCTION
Thank you very much, and thank you for having me here. I am
extremely honored to be speaking at this conference.
I have the impression, hearing what was discussed earlier, includ-
ing my name with my very distinguished colleagues and friends from
the Tribunals, that not much of what I will say is going to add a lot of
substance. Nonetheless, I hope that I can contribute some of my own
reflections. It will be, essentially, on themes that have been better
developed by others this morning. I will try to speak briefly, and then
I will be happy, if there is time, to take some of your questions.
I would like to begin by stating that I have been distracted in the
course of today's proceedings and yesterday's events. I hoped to be-
gin my presentation by making a joyful announcement. Regretfully,
this is not possible.
But, in any event, in fairness to the pressure of being forthcoming
to the media, I think I should share with you something that is now in
the public domain, which has not been widely covered. On March
6th, we, the Prosecutor's Office, filed in the Rwanda Tribunal for
confirmation of an indictment against Bagasoro and twenty-eight
others. I attended an in camera confirmation hearing last week in
Arusha. I regret to say that this indictment was not confirmed, and it
was dismissed yesterday. I will be at The Hague on Friday to work
on a notice of appeal. I hope I am not ruining lunch with this an-
nouncement. From my point of view, it is a set-back; but Bernard
Muna, Deputy Prosecutor for the Rwanda Tribunal, and I are ex-
tremely committed to pursuing this matter further.
The judgment is the subject of a non-disclosure order. So what I
have told you is in the public domain. Unfortunately, I cannot say
anything more except that I am not unduly alarmed. I have not seen
the actual text of the non-disclosure order, but I believe a copy has
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been sent to my hotel. The reason why it is attached with a
non-disclosure order will become apparent when that order is subse-
quently lifted. Now, having shared this disconcerting piece of news
with you, let me shift to what I really want to discuss.
Briefly, I will say a few general things, and then I will address
some observations on the issues that I think are most relevant, not
only to my experience in the two Tribunals, but to the proposed di-
rection for the creation of a permanent court. Then, in my usual frank
and direct way, I'll provide some advice to those lawmakers who
have our future in their hands.
I. REFLECTIONS ON THE RECORD OF THE TRIBUNALS
Let me start by reading a short extract from the transcript of the
Rwanda Tribunal of February 25, 1998, representing a portion of the
evidence submitted by General Romeo Dallaire, who is the United
Nations Commander in Rwanda. Towards the end of his testimony,
he stated the following, which echoes something that you have heard
this morning from the Rwanda ambassador.
General Dallaire said, "It seems to me unimaginable that every day
in the media, we see people being massacred, and yet we fold our
arms, we remain unperturbed, we remain isolated, without wanting to
come to aid, without wanting to come to their assistance."
He went on to say the following: "In my opinion, it has always
been very easy to accuse the United Nations of not having inter-
vened. But the United Nations are not the sovereign country." I think
that is going to be good news for Senator Helms.
General Dallaire continued and said, "The United Nations are we,
all of us. If the United Nations did not intervene, this means that, by
extension, all of us had failed. All of us had a responsibility for the
genocide that continued in Rwanda for almost four months."
The failure that General Dallaire spoke of can be modestly ad-
dressed and redeemed from a total failure if we can now bring it
amongst ourselves to hold these murderers, rapists, and torturers ac-
countable for their actions. I believe that is what criminal law does
domestically. And, I believe that this is the ambition of international
criminal law.
1998]
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Domestic criminal law serves as a realistic gauge in our assess-
ment of the performance of international criminal law so early in its
life span. Criminal law, generally, has one method of conflict resolu-
tion. When it is triggered, it is the testimony to the failure of virtually
all other social institutions. By the time criminal law is brought to its
full force-that is, to a criminal trial-it means that other social in-
stitutions like the family, the education system, the mental health in-
frastructure, the welfare distribution mechanisms in our society, the
children's aid society, and women's shelters, have either partially or
totally collapsed. Some things have dramatically gone wrong. That is
where criminal law intervenes.
So, I think we should not be overwhelmed by the sense of failure
expressed by General Dallaire even though he spoke forcefully on
this issue. This is, in fact, the last redemption and our last chance to
contribute effectively and address that situation.
Now, as promised earlier, I will provide some observations on the
issues that I believe are significant for the creation of a permanent
court. Overall, I have six points. Please note that these points are un-
connected and in no particular order.
II. PROSPECTS OF A PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE
First, I would like to discuss the complementarity and primacy of
international tribunals and possibly a permanent court over domestic
institutions. I have been told in many circles that this is not a nego-
tiable issue before the Rome conference. If that is correct, then I am
very disappointed. But, since I am not in the business of taking no
for an answer quickly, I think it is important that we forcefully ex-
amine the question of whether we should concede that the lack of
primacy of a permanent international court is acceptable.
I am very concerned that under the proposed system we are simply
re-arranging the chairs on the deck of the Titanic. Generally speak-
ing, it is difficult to be so blunt; but, the Tribunals share a common
experience. States who were the most affected by the crimes within
our jurisdiction-states that you would assume have the greatest in-
terest in the work of the Tribunals-are the ones who would be
happy to see the Tribunals discharged and settle their business in pri-
vate regardless of whether these settlements were either by expedi-
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tious, fair or unfair disposition; or, in many cases, by a very conven-
ient form of amnesty.
On the other hand, I believe other states who are the least af-
fected-who, in fact, are possibly not affected at all by the conflict,
but who endorse the concept of universal jurisdiction-would be
willing to discharge their obligations to prosecute by sending us all
the case work. I think this is very telling for the future of comple-
mentarity generally, and for the idea that a permanent International
Criminal Court would be in partnership with governments for the
prosecution of war crimes.
Second, I want to discuss state cooperation and compliance. It
took me a long time to understand why the governments with which I
interacted at the investigative stage were concerned about their mili-
tary, government officials, and diplomats actually being charged and
held personally and criminally responsible when there is no criminal
responsibility for governments under the statute. Therefore, I spent a
lot of time persuading them that this would not, at that stage, be the
purpose of the exercise. I specified that we were, in fact, collecting
evidence and treating them as witnesses.
Yet the resistance continued to be extremely strong. It took me a
long time to come to understand their reluctance. Then I finally real-
ized that even though there is no criminal responsibility for govern-
ments under the statute, there is only one court that counts-the court
of public opinion.
Third, it must be recognized that the thought of being a witness in
The Hague and having to disclose something that may tarnish a
military record or speak unfavorably of an unwise policy of the past,
was enough to keep people away from willing participation in our ef-
fort. This is an extremely discouraging concept. It takes considerable
effort to encourage a government to discharge their obligation to in-
ternational criminal justice, even when the cost to them, in my view,
is so minimal. Minimal as it is, it is always too high a cost for them
to willingly want to pay.
My fourth point, which many have spoken about this morning,
pertains to a chronic situation facing international criminal justice in
our lifetime; the fact that an international court sits in a vacuum. As a
result of this phenomenon, even a permanent International Criminal
Court cannot rest on the other pillars of democracy that we take for
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granted in our domestic criminal justice system. I speak, for instance,
of the absence in areas of the world in which our work matters so
much, of a free and independent media. I can refer to what we take
for granted domestically as the following: the existence of an inde-
pendent, but regulated profession; and the unconditional endorse-
ment of accountable governments who are required to enforce the
law. We cannot count on those two items.
More importantly, universal acceptance of the duty to give evi-
dence in criminal cases can be understood by all in our own society,
but not in the international arena. That duty supersedes all other le-
gitimate concerns, except in the narrow end of the lost privilege. It
covers the very few concerns that can trump the search for truth in a
criminal trial, like national security interests and the penitent priest
privilege. There is only a handful of these privileges that we uphold
above and beyond the duty to come to court and provide evidence.
We cannot make that assumption in the international forum. In fact, I
think it is extremely wise to proceed on exactly the opposite as-
sumption.
Most states and, I regret to say, most international organizations,
and probably many non-governmental organizations-in my opin-
ion-are not prepared to accept the fundamental premise that it is
their duty to come and give evidence in an international criminal fo-
rum. More significantly, this duty supersedes all other legitimate in-
terests. In fact, our assumptions are opposite to theirs. They believe
that testifying would jeopardize their field operation and would in
some way impede their capacity to do work that we all value and
cherish; but domestically, that would always have to yield to the
criminal process. We are nowhere near universal acceptance of the
duty to provide evidence on the international scene.
Now, I would like to turn to my fifth point, which is actually a
question. In particular, I question whether there is a future for inter-
national criminal justice without the existence of crimes falling
squarely within the ambit of its jurisdiction-like crimes against hu-
manity, war crimes, and genocide. Specifically, I am concerned
about having an equally potent and more widely applicable crime of
offenses against the administration of justice. The future of an inter-
national court is bleak unless we start thinking seriously of develop-
ing substantive offenses, chargeable not only against individuals, but
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also against groups, corporations, moral entities, and governments.
These entities should be charged as accessories after the fact in
situations where they shelter fugitives for violating court orders, in-
timidate witnesses, and interfere with the administration of justice.
Much has been said this morning, but I will add my voice to those
who advocate that we not let ourselves get pressured into a more ex-
peditious discharge of our mandate than is required to observe other
fundamental rules-such as the right of an accused to a fair and ex-
peditious trial. I am concerned that the pressure to get it done may
interfere with the pressure to get it right. This is particularly true for
the most difficult and elusive area of our investigative work, which is
command responsibility of accomplices other than the actual perpe-
trator. That part of the work is elusive in the extreme mainly because
the evidence is in the hands of those who will not willingly yield in-
formation to us.
I believe our work will be profoundly counter-productive as a long
term investment in peace and national reconciliation if we do it fast
and get it wrong. I do not want to shortchange history by short-
changing ourselves for the capacity to show the true magnitude of the
criminal organizations or the criminal drive that is really behind
these atrocities.
And, finally, the last observation I want to make is that I believe
future peacekeeping will never be the same. I believe that informa-
tion recorded during peacekeeping operations belongs to all and it is
objectionable for those who participate in these exercises to take it
home with them and refuse to share such information. If there can be
no peace without justice, then I believe there can be no real
peacekeeping without law enforcement for war crimes.
In my year and a half as prosecutor, and as an Appellate Court
Judge, on many occasions I faced in terrorem arguments. If you are
familiar with this old tactic of advancing arguments, you know that
immense catastrophe can result. In virtually everything I do, I con-
front in terrorem arguments. As such, I would urge lawmakers, who
are presently examining the creation of a permanent court, to resist,
at all costs, this form of discourse and debate. I was told, I believe,
every one of these arguments has been proven or will be proven
grossly inaccurate. But these arguments are advanced by very serious
people-I presume in good faith-but in a very misguided fashion.
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It is said, and continues to be said, that if peacekeepers are called
to account before a Tribunal-and by account, I mean not be exposed
to personal criminal liability but merely to explain how they dis-
charged their function-then no country will ever again contribute
troops to a peacekeeping operation. I believe that this is an in terro-
rei argument that is likely to be proven false in the future.
In the same manner, I was told that if we collectively pressed for
arrests by SFOR, then hostility would immediately resume in Bosnia.
I was told that if I pressed, as I did, seeking a decision by the court,
that we had the power to issue binding orders to states, which we did
successfully, I was told, once again, in one of these in terrorem ar-
guments, that this initiative could be the single one that could bring
the talks toward the permanent court to a halt. So I say we must resist
these arguments that are based on rather pessimistic views of the fu-
ture.
CONCLUSION
On the eve of the conference in Rome, I urge lawmakers to re-
member the common law history of the offense of treason. You may
recall that the crime of treason was the crime that, throughout the
ages, carried the highest level of procedural safeguard because it was
clear to lawmakers that they were more likely to be charged with this
crime in the course of their lifetime. We, therefore, attached a tre-
mendous procedural safeguard to our model for the prosecution of
treason.
I urge those who will be in Rome to design a system good enough
for themselves. Only if they design a model of criminal justice that
they believe is good enough for themselves, can they then have the
right to insist that it apply to others.
Thank you very much.
AUDIENCE QUESTIONS
MR. NEJER: Thank you very much, indeed. Justice Arbour has
agreed to answer questions. Please, go ahead.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would like to pick up on an observation
made about Kosovo. Justice Arbour, it seems to me that there is an
enormous opportunity for the Tribunal to play a role in deterring and
preventing genocide in Kosovo.
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One of the most effective ways to do that, following up on the
contact that we have already made on this issue, could be for you, or
whoever happens to be on the staff, to go to Kosovo and put down a
marker to make sure that ethnic cleansing does not reoccur there-
essentially, to make a message of accountability.
Is that anything that you would have or would consider doing?
JUSTICE ARBOuR: I have made a public announcement that my of-
fice will be investigating and is investigating the events in Kosovo. I
am not sure that personally going there is likely to advance my in-
vestigations a great deal. I think it is critically important for our Tri-
bunal that we discharge our function in a professional manner. Our
actions should not contain a suggestion that we are merely respon-
sive to political pressures or an advancement of political interests.
We are very clear as to what the legal landscape is within which we
can operate. Areas that we can work in, that we have already referred
to, include the territorial jurisdiction of the Court.
It does not take an advanced legal education to identify possible
offenses to include in these very preliminary investigations based on
information available in the public domain. We know what types of
offenses to reasonably target. We have identified the areas we need
to investigate. I have to say that the best investigative work is not al-
ways the one that is field work. Seeing investigators in the field does
not infer that you have made the most progress.
Sometimes the most difficult part of the work is establishing all of
the elements of the offenses. It is not a mystery in these circles
whether or not there was, is, or will continue to be an armed conflict
in Kosovo. This is a matter to which we have to pay considerable at-
tention. You understand that within our Tribunal, of course, this has
to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not just an intuitive
assessment. So we have an investigation strategy. But I have to say,
at this point, I have not contemplated my presence there.
I expect that I may be in Bosnia in the near future. I just returned
from Belgrade and Montenegro before the current events in Kosovo.
I am not sure that I could go there by myself and investigate with any
level of sophistication.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You mentioned, Justice Arbour, how states
are propelled, not by their legal obligations, but by their fear of pub-
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lic censure. It could be possible that if the Tribunals employed a me-
dia-friendly approach, it could generate public rage over officials
sheltering planners of genocide. Strategically, to rephrase the ques-
tion, since public censure and fear are such effective forms of moti-
vation, could the Tribunal indirectly arouse a media frenzy strategy?
JUSTICE ARBOUR: Yes, but I think it is always wise to proceed on
the rather trite assumption that states, like people, always behave in
what they perceive to be their best self interests. So, they will have to
balance the measure of shame that they can face. In other words, they
will weigh the shame for not willingly testifying in a criminal trial
against the shame that they will suffer if they do testify. At the end of
the day, I think it is a pretty crude decision on their part as to whether
they are prepared.
Frankly, I think at this stage of our work-at this stage of our ju-
risprudence-and at this stage of the political support we have in the
international community, that evidence will be forthcoming. But, at
the end of the day, I am not concerned about that.
I believe the evidence will be forthcoming, and that most govern-
ments will take the stand and come forward. A lot of evidence has
been made available as a result of public opinion. That is the postur-
ing. Now, we have to get them to deliver, to actually open up to the
scrutiny of the Prosecutor, originally, and I will endorse Mr. Wladi-
miroff's concern that we should also be open to the scrutiny of the
defense. The governments should be open to the scrutiny of the Tri-
bunal, to the most limited extent that they think they can get away
with.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Justice Arbour, following up on that point,
could you bring us up to date on your relations with the French Gov-
ernment and also the Croatian Government?
JUSTICE ARBOUR: Well, I am very pleased that you asked that
question. I am pleased to report that my relations with the French
Government are excellent.
You may be aware of the statement made by the Foreign Minister,
Mr. Levine, who came to The Hague approximately three weeks or a
month ago. We had extensive discussions after the visit I made to
Paris, which I think were less productive. In the course of his latest
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visit, however, he publicly announced that French military officers
and French officials may freely testify.
I was asked, when I was in Arusha last week, why he only referred
to The Hague Tribunal. The assumption in the French media has al-
ways been that all the difficulties that we had encountered in the past
with France were really related to the former Yugoslavia and the real
agenda was one of alleged obstruction with respect to the Hague Tri-
bunal.
No such distinctions were made to me. I understood the French
position to be extremely clear and forthcoming-which is that if they
are called, they will testify. I am very pleased. This is without any
particular reservation, except what is available to all who cooperate
with the Tribunal, which is: some evidence we could choose to take
under Rule 70, our confidentiality rule. Of course, in appropriate
cases, I have indicated that I will cooperate in advocating any kind of
protective measure that is appropriate with respect to any kind of in-
terest that France, or any other country, would want to advocate for
some of its witnesses.
With respect to Croatia, who I have picked a fight with recently, I
am very unwilling, frankly, to rate government cooperation among
those with whom we have a most intensive on-going relationship.
Cooperation has many facets. There is no question that we tend to
get, although it is not always true of all, the very best cooperation
when what we ask is in the self-interest of that government. This is
not a big surprise.
But, even that was certainly not the case with respect to the Re-
public of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Even when
we were seeking information related to Serb victims of perpetrators
from any other group, this information was not forthcoming. I think
we have overcome that particular difficulty. There has been a consid-
erable effort on the part of Croatia, in the instance of the surrenders.
In particular, we saw this diplomatic effort in the Fall.
I am still very dissatisfied with the speed and completeness, or let
me put it this way, the lack of responses to requests for assistance in
on-going investigations. Although the matter is before the court, I am
appalled that the litigation initiated more than a year ago, which gave
rise to a judgment in principle legally binding the Government of
Croatia for the production of documents, is still being vigorously
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contested. We still have not seen a lot of what we asked for and what
we are entitled to.
It is very difficult to give you a rating, a comparative quality of
cooperation. For the most part, at the current level of investigations,
it is extremely discouraging to try to obtain what we are perfectly
entitled to under the statute.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Have you found that Rule 70 has proved use-
ful in helping you obtain information from governments?
JUSTICE ARBOUR: Yes, it has proved very useful. It was particu-
larly useful before we litigated our entitlement to the evidence in the
first place. Rule 70 was particularly useful. For those of you who are
not familiar with the details of our rule, this is a provision by which
the Prosecutor can receive information in full confidence, essentially
undertaking never to use that information without the prior approval
of the source.
It is a procedure used to develop and essentially to lead to actual
evidence that you can use in court, without having to reveal the
original source. It is, frankly, and we have to live in a realistic world,
the only mechanism by which we can have access to military intelli-
gence from any source.
I believe we must now use it very cautiously. It was a very useful
device, until we tested our entitlement to compel the production of
some evidence. I think that now that we have that behind us, we must
be circumspect in not using Rule 70 as generously as we have in the
past. Now we are in court, more and more. If somebody holding a
candy says I will give it to you under Rule 70 and you want it badly
enough and take it; then after you have it, you want to use it in court
but you are not allowed. You realize that this was not such a good
strategy, especially if you thought you had a real chance of getting
the candy some other way.
So, it is a very useful device, but I think that we have to be very
circumspect in the manner in which we use it. Not to mention the
fact that when it is triggered, we bind ourselves not to use it, and af-
terwards, we curtail the rights of the defense, and indeed the scope of
investigation by the court itself. So I think it is ethically and profes-
sionally a device that the Prosecutor ought to use with considerable
discretion and not take lightly.
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